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MEETING THE INSANITY DEFENSE
THOMAS A. FLANNERY*
The author has been an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia since 1950.
During that time, he has prosecuted over 300 jury cases including many notable homicides involving
the defense of insanity.
Insanity is frequently a defense in the trial of crimes carrying severe penalties. In this article,
Mr. Flannery contends that although this defense is often meritorious, it is also sometimes abused.
The author then directs his attention to the problems which arise in the prosecution of those cases
where there is genuine disagreement as to the defendant's mental condition or where the defense of
insanity actually appears to be spurious. In that connection, he offers a number of suggestions with
respect to the timing and thoroughness of the psychiatric examination of the defendant, the problem
of recognizing and meeting a case of "prison psychosis," the use of lay witnesses, and the proper
formulation and utilization of hypothetical questions. Mr Flannery also sets forth a series of specific
questions which he has found to be effective in the cross examination of psychiatrists testifying for
the defense.
This article is substantially based upon lectures on the insanity defense delivered by the author
at the 1959 and 1960 Northwestern University Short Courses for Prosecuting Attorneys.-EDITOR.
Insanity as a defense in criminal cases is fre-
quently used and sometimes abused. The fre-
quency of its use as a defense in criminal cases
seems to rise almost in direct proportion to the
severity of the punishment; it is seldom used in
the less serious felony or misdemeanor cases where
there is no possibility of the imposition of the
death penalty or a long term of imprisonment.
Although the sole purpose of this article is to
suggest certain procedures which the prosecutor
may follow to counteract this defense when it is
interposed in a criminal case, it seems appropriate
at the outset to refer to the various definitions of
insanity used throughout the United States under
which one may be excused from criminal responsi-
bility?1 Since the District of Columbia at one time
* The views and opinions expressed herein are solely
the writer's based on his personal experience in handling
criminal prosecutions.
I See A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE, Appendix A § 4.01,
at 161 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
Right-wrong test.
31 States, and probably one additional state.
Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and probably Rhode Island.
In Maine and West Virginia the test apparently is in-
terpreted to require a certain capacity for control as
well as cognition.
Right-wrong, irresistible impulse test.
14 States, the federal jurisdiction, U.S. Army, and 1
State with delusional impulse test.
Federal jurisdiction, U.S. Army, Alabama, Arkan-
or another in its history has employed practically
all of these different tests, I will advert briefly to
the history of the insanity law in the District of
Columbia for the purpose of explaining the differ-
ences in the several tests currently being used.
Until July 1, 1954, the test of legal insanity in
the District of Columbia had been the right and
wrong test supplemented by the irresistible im-
pulse test. The rationality test, or right and
wrong test, may be traced back to the Roman
Law, where it was believed that the insane lacked
free will, and ultimately to the Greek philosophers
Plato and Aristotle. In the middle of the 19th
Century the House of Lords in the famous Mc-
Naghten2 case restated this test in a form which
since has been followed not only in England but
also in most American jurisdictions. In the Mc-
Naghten case it was stated that:
"The jurors ought to be told in all cases that
every man is presumed to be sane and to possess a
sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for
sas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming; Georgia (delusional
impulse).
Prodwt of mental disease or defect test.
1 State (New Hampshire) and the District of Co-
lumbia.
Test not dear.
1 State (Montana). Failure to meet requirements of
the right-wrong, irresistible impulse test seems ground
for acquittal, and probably persons incapable of form-
ing a criminal intent are also excused.
28 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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his crimes until the contrary be proved to their
satisfaction; and that to establish a defense on the
grounds of insanity it must be clearly proved that
at the time of the committing of the act the party
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason
from disease of the mind as not to know the nature
and quality of what he was doing or if he did know
it that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong."
In 1929, in the Smith' case, the irresistible im-
pulse test was added as a supplementary test for
determining criminal responsibility in the District
of Columbia. In Smith it was held that the mere
ability to distinguish between right and wrong
was no longer the correct test where the defense
of insanity was interposed. In this case the court
said:
".... the accused must be capable not only of
distinguishing between right and wrong but that
he was not impelled to do the act by an irresistible
impulse which means before it will justify a verdict
of acquittal that his reasoning powers were so far
dethroned by his diseased mental condition as to
deprive him of the will power to resist the insane
impulse to perpetrate the deed, though knowing
it to be wrong."
In July, 1954, in the now renowned Durham4
case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia handed down a new rule on
insanity which in effect superseded the right and
wrong and irresistible impulse tests. Simply stated
this new test held that "an accused is not crim-
inally responsible if his unlawful act was the prod-
uct of mental disease or defect." Actually the
so called Durham rule is merely a restatement of
the definition of insanity laid down in the Pike5
case decided in New Hampshire in 1869. Under
this rule it is now possible for a defendant suffering
from a mental disease or defect to win an acquittal
by reason of insanity despite the fact that he knew
the difference between right and wrong and was
not driven by an insane irresistible impulse to
commit the criminal act, for the test is no longer,
solely, whether the defendant knew the nature and
quality of his criminal act, but whether the act was
3 Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir.
1929).
4 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
5 State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (1869). See also State v.
Jones, 50 N. H. 369 (1871).
caused by mental disease or defect.- The terms
mental disease and defect encompass a variety of
mental conditions.'
In certain cases it is now possible for even the
psychopath or sociopath to win an acquittal by
reason of insanity since many psychiatrists believe
that such an individual suffers from a mental
disease.7 In the District of Columbia once a de-
fendant has introduced some evidence of insanity
which is sufficient to overcome the presumption of
sanity, the Government must then prove sanity at
the time of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover it has been held that where the evidence
of insanity is convincing and the Government has
been unable to produce substantial evidence of the
defendant's sanity at the time of the crime, the
court must take the case away from the jury and
direct a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.8
Although its adherents have vigorously sought
to have the Durham Rule adopted in other juris-
dictions they have been singularly unsuccessful;
the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions appear
to take the view, at this time, that those who have
cognition of the nature.and quality of a deliberate
criminal act should be held accountable and
responsible in the eyes of the law.9 The Durham
5' When a defendant has been found not guilty by
reason of insanity, the District of Columbia Code pro-
vides that he shall remain in a mental institution until
the Superintendent certifies that he has recovered his
sanity and is no longer dangerous. D. C. CODE, tit. 24,
§301.
6In defining disease and defect in the Durham case,
the court said: "We use 'disease' in the sense of a condi-
tion which is considered capable of either improving or
deteriorating. We use 'defect' in the sense of a condition
which is not considered capable of either improving or
deteriorating and which may be either congenital, or
the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical
or mental disease."
7Blocker v. United States - F.2d -, decided
by United States Court of Appeals for District of
Columbia on June 25, 1959, No. 14274; Overholser v.
Leach, 257 F.2d 667 (D. C. Cir. 1958).
8 Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir.
1956); Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir.
1957); Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d (D.C. Cir.
1957); Grover Lee Isaac v. United States - F.2d
-,tdecided by United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia on January 21, 1960.
'State v. Goza, 317 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1958); Com-
monwealth v. Chester, 150 N.E.2d 914 (Mass. 1958);
State v. Goyet, 120 Vt. 12, 132 A.2d 623 (1957); Sollars
v. State, 73 Nev. 248, 316 P.2d 917, rehearing denied,
73 Nev. 343, 319 P.2d 139 (1957); People v. Carpenter,
11 Ill. 2d 60, 142 N.E.2d 11 (1957); tate v. Collins, 50
Wash. 2d 740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957); People v. Ryan,
140 Cal. App. 2d 412, 295 P.2d 496 (1956); Flowers v.
State, 236 Ind. 151, 139 N.E.2d 185 (1956); Bryant v.
State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955). Quite recently
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decision has provoked much discussion and con-
troversy. However, as previously stated, it is not
the purpose of this article to discuss the relative
merits of the Durham Rule as opposed to any
other test of legal insanity, but rather to suggest
various practical techniques which the prosecutor
may fairly employ in combating this defense when
it is raised during a criminal trial.
It should never be forgotten that a prosecuting
attorney is a servant of the law, and it is his duty
to see not only that the guilty shall not escape
but also that the innocent and those not legally
responsible shall not be convicted. Occasionally
cases arise where the evidence unquestionably
reveals that the defendant was insane under
existing law and therefore not legally responsible
for his criminal act. Justice is served in such an
instance by a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity. The situation I will discuss is one where
it appears that the defense of insanity is fraudulent
or where there is a genuine disagreement as to the
defendant's mental condition.
How To PREPARE TO MEET THE DEFENSE
Assume that a very vicious murder or rape has
been committed in your jurisdiction and you have
the duty of prosecuting the defendant. Assume
further that you either have been advised or have
reasonable grounds to believe that the defense will
be insanity. Under these circumstances what steps
should the prosecutor take to insure that the
defense will be fairly met and that justice will be
done to all concerned, bearing in mind that a
criminal trial should be a search for truth and
justice and not a mere game or battle of experts?
Pennsylvania, in a strong opinion, reaffirmed its ad-
herence to McNaghten. See Commonwealth v. Novak,
395 Pa. 199, 150 A.2d 102 (1959). See also State v.
Lucas, 30 N. J. 37, 152 A.2d 50 (1959). Cf., Sauer v.
United States, 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 940 (1957); Anderson v. United States, 237 F.
2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956); Howard v. United States, 232
F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1956). In Anderson v. United
States, supra at 127, the court held that it was bound
by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), and
Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946), and
therefore could not follow Durham, but further indi-
cated that "it had no desire to join the courts of New
Hampshire and the District of Columbia in their
'magnificent isolation' of rebellion against McNaghten,
even though New Hampshire has been traveling down
that lonesome road since 1870. See State v. Pike, 49
N. H. 399. Rather than stumble along with Pike, we
prefer to trudge along the now well-traveled pike
blazed more than a century ago by McNaghten."
Arrangements should be made immediately to
have the defendant given a thorough psychiatric
examination as soon after the crime as possible.
This is important because competent, experienced
psychiatrists agree that it is usually difficult to
render an opinion as to a person's mental condition
at a time prior to the time of the original examina-
tion. This is particularly true when it appears that
the person examined did not suffer from organic
brain damage or have a prior history of hospitaliza-
tion. It is advisable to have at least two psychi-
atrists examine the defendant and also to have a
skilled psychologist conduct a psychological
examination. It is preferable to have the psychi-
atric examination performed in a mental hospital
over a period of from 30 to 90 days. In this way
malingerers can be more readily detected and a
more thorough psychiatric examination con-
ducted.
In a recent case where the defendant had been
indicted for first degree murder, the hospital
records revealed that when the defendant ap-
peared for his regular interview with the psy-
chiatrists he displayed what appeared to be gross
symptoms of mental disease, in that he spoke of
hearing voices, was emotionally upset, and ap-
peared to be in a constant state of agitation and
fear. However, the hospital records further re-
vealed that the ward attendants noted that on
the ward he was lucid at all times, friendly, co-
operative, extremely interested in politics and
sports, and active in the various programs initiated
for the-benefit of the patients, i.e., that he didn't
display any of the symptoms which he evidenced
only when interviewed by the doctors. The jury
heard all of this evidence, and their verdict indi-
cated that they were not impressed with the
defendant's contention that he was insane, al-
though several psychiatrists had been greatly
impressed.
If for some reason it is not possible to have the
examination conducted in a hospital, it can be
done in jail, but it is emphasized that every effort
should be made to have the defendant examined
immediately after the crime. The psychiatrists
should make a careful examination into the de-
fendant's background and should be given an
opportunity to study the facts in the case and to
talk to the witnesses so that they may know how
the defendant acted on the day of the crime. If at
all possible the examination should include a
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complete physical and neurological examination,
an electro-encephalogram test, as well as the other
modern methods of examination.
Not to be overlooked is the importance of the
lay witness in proving the defendant's sanity.
Juries are often much more impressed with the
observations of the victim of a rape or robbery,
the persons who witnessed the crime and heard
what the defendant said or observed what he did,
and the police officers who apprehended the
defendant and interrogated him, than they are
with the opinion of a psychiatrist who saw the
defendant for the first time days, weeks, or months
after the crime had been committed and then only
for a brief period. A lay witness can testify as to
how a defendant acted and, in most jurisdictions,
may state his opinion as to the defendant's sanity.
A lay witness certainly can testify as to whether a
defendant appeared confused and bewildered or
whether he perpetrated the crime in an efficient
and cunning manner. With respect to lay witnesses
it is advisable also to make every effort to secure
witnesses who had daily contact with the de-
fendant, including his associates, employers and
neighbors. The testimony of the lay witness who
has had prolonged and intimate contact with the
defendant of course will carry greater weight than
the testimony of a lay witness who saw him only
for a brief period.
Many people who commit crimes are emotionally
unstable or suffer from mild mental disorders.
Often after this type of individual has committed
a crime and has been incarcerated he may de-
velop what is sometimes termed prison psychosis.
This condition is precipitated by incarceration
and by the defendant's realization of the conse-
quences of his wrongful act. A psychiatrist may
examine a defendant several weeks or months
after a crime and discover him to be psychotic at
that time and showing true symptoms of mental
disease. However, do not overlook the possibility
that this may be "prison psychosis." The fact
that a defendant may be psychotic after the crime
does not necessarily mean that he was psychotic
or not mentally responsible on the date of the
crime. That is why it is important to have the
defendant examined by psychiatrists immediately
after the crime and to secure the testimony of
lay witnesses who had the opportunity to observe
the defendant prior to and during the commission
of the crime. Psychosis caused by incarceration
often clears up after a defendant is removed from
jail and transferred to a hospital environment or
when the pending charges are dropped.
The hypothetical question can often be used
to great advantage in cases involving the defense
of insanity. In a hypothetical question the expert
witness is asked to assume the truth of certain
facts and then to express an opinion based upon
the truth of the hypothetical facts. Before a
hypothetical question may be asked the facts upon
which the question is based must be established
by the evidence. Suppose as a prosecutor you have
the duty of prosecuting a case wherein a psychi-
atrist has examined a defendant charged with
murder several months after the crime and found
him to be psychotic evidencing clear symptoms of
mental disease. Suppose further, however, that
the evidence reveals that the defendant had
planned this crime in a cool, calculating manner,
had attempted to cover up all traces of the crime
by destroying the evidence, had carefully removed
his fingerprints at the scene of the crime, and had
hidden the stolen money or buried the body.
Assume also that when apprehended he at first
furnished a false alibi but then finally made a
complete confession, and that during this time he
was coherent and in full possession of his faculties
and displayed no mental symptoms. Suppose
further that after having been transferred from
jail to a mental hospital the defendant recovered
from his psychosis. Assume then that at the trial
a psychiatrist called by the defendant testified
that the defendant had been of unsound mind on
the date of the crime and that a psychiatrist
called by you had a different opinion and would
testify that the defendant had been of sound mind
on the date of the crime. Under these circum-
stances it would be advisable to ask the prosecu-
tion psychiatrist a hypothetical question in which
he would be asked to assume that the defendant
had committed the crime as outlined, had dis-
played no mental symptoms at that time and had
been found to have a psychosis sometime later
which cleared up after he had been transferred to
a mental institution. Assuming the truth of those
facts and taking them into consideration together
with his knowledge of the defendant gained from
his personal examination, the witness then might
be asked whether he had an opinion as to the
defendant's sanity on the date of the crime,
whether the defendant knew the difference between
right and wrong on the date of the crime, or
whether in his opinion based on the hypothetical
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facts, the defendant had a mental disease or defect
on the date of the crime which caused him to
commit the crime. The doctor .could also be asked
whether assuming the truth of the hypothetical
facts he had an opinion whether the defendant
developed the psychosis after the crime.
Furthermore it would be possible to ask the
witness whether the defendant's actions on the
date of the crime were the manifestations and
symptoms of a person of unsound mind. At times
the same hypothetical question can be used on
cross examination of the defense psychiatrist and
your case may be helped regardless of the answer
of the witness. If the facts dearly show that the
defendant had exhibited no unusual mental
symptoms on the date of the crime and the de-
fense psychiatrist nevertheless stubbornly insists
that the hypothetical facts make no difference
as far as his opinion is concerned, then the jury
probably will not be impressed with his testimony.
On the other hand if the witness concedes that
the question revealed no unusual mefntal behavior
by the defendant on the day of the crime, then
you have greatly weakened the effect of his testi-
mony.
The hypothetical question is a potent weapon
when properly used, but it should be carefully
prepared beforehand. The question should be
discussed with the witness before trial and should
be written out and submitted to the Court for
approval before it is asked. This will avoid the
possibility of having an objection causing the
question to be ruled out during the trial with
resulting damage to your case.
Several years ago a most unusual murder case
involving the defense of insanity was prosecuted
in the District of Columbia. l" What happened in
that case is an outstanding example of how psy-
chosis can develop during incarceration and the
value of the hypothetical question in directing the
jury's attention to that fact. The facts revealed
that in 1938 the defendant had murdered a woman
by placing potassium cyanide in a drink of whiskey.
He was arrested the day after the crime and
dictated a lengthy confession which he signed
after reading it carefully and initialling certain
corrections. At the time of his arrest and con-
fession the defendant appeared lucid and in full
possession of his faculties, and he displayed a
clear recollection of what he had done. About a
10 Askins v. United States, 231 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir.
1956).
month later, while incarcerated in jail awaiting
trial, the defendant began to display unusual
mental symptoms. He was examined by several
psychiatrists who found him to be psychotic
suffering from dementia praecox, catatonic type.
The outstanding symptoms of the disease were
stupor and a withdrawal from reality. His re-
collection was poor and he appeared to have little
recollection of the crime. The defendant was
thereupon committed to a mental institution
where he remained for many years. Finally in
1955, over sixteen years after the crime, he was
adjudicated competent and went on trial for the
murder. At the trial his confession was read to
the jury and there was conflicting ptychiatric
testimony as to his mental condition on the date
of the crime. Lay witnesses testified in regard to
the defendant's apparently normal behavior during
his confession and the doctors were asked a
lengthy hypothetical question which incorporated
all the facts and the history of the case. The
doctors were then asked to give an opinion whether
the defendant had been of unsound mind when he
committed the crime or whether he had developed
the psychosis after the crime. Several psychiatrists
gave different opinions. The jury found the de-
fendant guilty of second degree murder. The
jurors later stated that they were impressed by
the fact that the defendant had been able to
dictate his confession very accurately, even to the
extent of initialling certain corrections, and ap-
parently had a clear recollection of events shortly
after the crime. They were convinced that the
defendant had developed the psychosis while in
jail awaiting trial. The result in this case is a
striking example of not only the potency of the
hypothetical question when properly utilized but
also the importance that the jurors sometimes
place upon lay witness testimony.
How TO CRoss ExAV= A PSYCRATRIST
After the defense psychiatrist has testified the
prosecutor must undertake the delicate task of
cross examination. All experienced trial lawyers
realize that one must approach the task of cross
examining an expert in any field with care and
caution. This is particularly true of the medical
doctor and psychiatrist. These men have spent
years in preparing themselves for their chosen
work and most of them are well qualified and able
to handle themselves on the witness stand.
Some psychiatrists, however, are not as well
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qualified as others and are extremely vulnerable
on cross examination. There are a certain few
psychiatrists who appear in case after case to
testify that defendants were insane when they
committed certain crimes despite the fact that
the defendants have been found to be of sound
mind by competent psychiatrists or had exhibited
no mental symptoms either before, after, or while
committing their crimes. It is not unusual to find
that such a witness will glibly testify that in his
opinion the defendant was of unsound mind on
the date of the crime, although he examined him
long after the crime and only for a brief period
and did nothing else by way of independent
investigation. The fact that the expert witness
can testify that he was graduated from a medical
school and possesses an impressive list of degrees,
has written a number of books, and belongs to
many medical organizations does not necessarily
mean that he is a competent psychiatrist.
It is well to ascertain first of all whether a
psychiatrist is a diplomate and has been certified
as a specialist in psychiatry by the American
Board of Psychiatry and Neurology. In order to
be so certified one must have served for three
years as a resident in psychiatry at an approved
hospital and after that have had two years of
practical experience. Then he must pass stringent
written and oral examinations before he may be
certified as a specialist by the American Board of
Psychiatry and Neurology. The prosecutor
should check this before the witness takes the
stand. If the psychiatrist has not been certified
as a diplomate his testimony may be weakened
at the outset in the eyes of the jury.
If a psychiatrist is reputed or known to be a
"defense expert" by virtue of his appearance on
behalf of the defense in numerous criminal cases,
it is well to inquire as to how many times he has
testified as an expert and then to develop the
fact that on all of these occasions he has testified
that a defendant was of unsound mind. These
matters should be checked beforehand also, since
an adverse answer could seriously damage your
case.
The fact that a witness may belong to a great
number of professional societies may sound im-
pressive to a jury, but the only prerequisite to
membership may be the payment of dues. Like-
wise the witness may have written a number of
books, but they may consist of advice to married
people or deal with subjects which would hardly
qualify him as an expert on insane criminals.
However, it is only fair to state that very few
psychiatrists will venture to give an opinion unless
they have had the opportunity to make a thorough
examination and are in a position to give a valid
opinion. My experience has shown that most
psychiatrists are men of integrity who have de-
voted their lives to treating mentally sick people.
The great majority of psychiatrists will give an
honest opinion of a defendant's mental condition
whether they are retained by the prosecution or
by the defendant. However, the so-called "pro-
fessional witness" or "defense psychiatrist" has
done much to damage the reputation of psychiatry
generally. This is unfortunate because psychia-
trists are doing a tremendous job in combating
mental illness, which is the nation's most serious
health problem.
With regard to qualifications, it is suggested
that the qualifications of the prosecution psy-
chiatrist should never be stipulated. Juries are
extremely interested in the qualifications of expert
witnesses. The prosecution psychiatrist should
testify as to his educational background and
experience in great detail. For obvious reasons
defense lawyers are usually eager to stipulate a
doctor's qualifications, particularly if he happens
to be an outstanding man in his field. However, it
should not be forgotten that although the court and
counsel for both sides may know of the doctor's
qualifications and have the greatest respect for him,
most of the jury probably have never heard of
him. Therefore, to stipulate his qualifications at
the outset of his testimony, without having him
tell the jury about his background, is a mistake,
and the jury probably will not accord his testi-
mony the weight they would have given it had
they heard about his educational background and
experience.
On cross examination every effort should be
made to have the psychiatrist explain his diag-
nosis and opinion in simple, everyday language
which a jury can understand. Insist that the
witness give common sense, valid reasons to
fortify his opinions. The facts in each case are
different and no set formula for cross examination
can be devised for use in every case. However,
there are certain questions which, with some
variations, can be asked in most cases involving
the defense of insanity and which will aid the
jury to understand and intelligently appraise the
evidence. Experience has shown that the following
questions, when asked during cross examination
of a defense psychiatrist, will help the jury to
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decide whether the defendant has been given a
thorough examination and how much weight
should be accorded the testimony:
1. How long after the date of the crime did you
first examine the defendant? (This question is
important since most competent psychiatrists
will state that it is extremely difficult to give an
opinion as to a person's mental condition at a
time prior to the time he first examined him.)
2. How many times did you examine the de-
fendant?
3. What was the total amount of time you
spent with the defendant?
4. Did the defendant have a prior psychiatric
history?
5. What independent investigation have you
made in this case?
6. Have you talked to defendant's family,
fellow employees, friends, neighbors?
7. Do you know the facts in this case?
It is not unusual to find that a psychiatrist will
state that a defendant was of unsound mind on
the date of the crime, and yet not know exactly
how the defendant perpetrated the crime or how
he acted on the date of the crime. In another
recent case in the District of Columbia, the de-
fendant was indicted for rape and interposed the
defense of insanity. The facts revealed that he had
kidnapped his victim in Maryland while she was
parking her automobile and had driven to a se-
cluded area in Washington where he raped her.
He then fled from the scene, but in his haste to
escape he dropped a wallet containing his identi-
fication. He was apprehended shortly thereafter
and vigorously denied the crime and stated that
he had an alibi. When confronted with the victim
who identified him and the evidence of the wallet,
he continued to deny the crime and claimed that
he had lost his wallet a week prior to the crime.
It appeared that five years before the crime that
the defendant had been hospitalized briefly for
treatment for psychosis. During the trial several
psychiatrists testified for the defendant and ex-
pressed the opinion that he had been of unsound
mind on the date of the crime. They were then
asked to tell the jury what they knew about the
facts of the case. It developed that they knew
very little of the defendant's actions on the night
of the crime, but were relying on his past history
of hospitalization plus what the defendant told
them while being interviewed. When these doctors
were told that the defendant had given several
conflicting alibis, had lied about losing his wallet,
and were then asked if this didn't indicate that
he really was a very clever individual rather than
a person of unsound mind, they merely shrugged
their shoulders and stated that even if they had
known these facts before they would have attached
no significance to them. One doctor went on to
state that any one who committed rape had to be
suffering from a mental disease in any event.
Before cross examination was finally completed
some of the jurors were detected looking at the
witnesses in a very skeptical manner, and their
verdict of guilty returned shortly thereafter indi-
cated that they believed that the government had
proven the defendant sane beyond any reasonable
doubt.
8. What symptoms did the defendant exhibit
when you examined him? (Develop whether the
diagnosis fits the action of defendant on date of
crime-e.g., a doctor may find a defendant in a
catatonic stupor months after the crime, but he
may have been very alert while committing the
crime.)
9. Did you have psychological tests made?
10. Did you have examinations made to de-
termine the presence of organic brain disease?
(a) An X-ray examination.
(b) A physical examination.
(c) Electro-encephalogram test, e.g., tracing
of waves generated by electrical impulses from
brain which may indicate epilepsy or brain tumors.
(d) Pneumo-encephalogram test. In this test
air is injected into the brain. X-rays of the brain
will then show any unusual spaces in the brain.
(e) Neurological examination, e.g., a check of
the central nervous system damage.
If the witness did not conduct these various
tests it can be argued that his examination was
woefully inadequate. If he did conduct the tests
and found no organic brain damage then he can
be asked the following question:
11. Then, doctor, you are relying entirely on
what the defendant told you about his symptoms
or what you observed about his behavior while
talking to him?
12. Since you found nothing organically wrong
there is a possibility that the defendant is maling-
ering since your opinion rests on his demeanor and
behavior while being observed by you.
13. Did defendant know the difference between
right and wrong?
If the answer is no, then the following questions
might be asked depending upon the circumstances.
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14. (a) Then why did the defendant flee from
the scene?
(b) Then why did he pick a secluded spot to
commit the crime?
(c) Then why did he lie to the police if he did
not realize he had done wrong?
15. What was the defendant's motive (to
secure money, to satisfy his lust, to gain revenge;
or was he driven by some insane delusion to
commit the crime)?
16. Do you believe that all criminals suffer
from mental disease? (There are some psychia-
trists who believe that all criminals are suffering
from mental disease. When a jury hears a psy-
chiatrist state this, they usually disregard his
testimony.)
17. Have you ever testified in court that a
defendant was of sound mind? (This question
should be saved for the "professional" defense
psychiatrist.)
CONCLUSION
In this brief discussion, it is impossible to
discuss all of the various ways to cross exam-
ine a psychiatrist, but the answers to the ques-
tions suggested will open up new avenues of
cross examination. Occasionally one can spend
hours in effective cross examination of a psy-
chiatrist. It is emphasized that the witness should
be made to answer questions in language which
the jury can understand. If the expert does not
give common sense reasons for his opinion in
understandable ,language, the jury will usually
disregard his testimony.
Every prosecutor should have a basic knowl-
edge of psychiatry and know about the various
mental diseases and their symptoms. In the
District of Columbia last year, certain members
of the staff of St. Elizabeths Hospital conducted a
series of lectures on mental disease for the benefit
of members of the United States Attorney's staff.
These lectures proved to be helpful and certainly
led to better understanding between the prose-
cutors and the doctors of the various problems
arising from the use of insanity as a defense.
Discussions of this nature between law enforce-
ment officials and members of the medical pro-
fession constitute an ideal way by which the
prosecutor may acquire some understanding
concerning mental diseases and defects, and with
this knowledge he will then, during the trial, be
much better qualified to develop the psychiatric
testimony in a clear, intelligent manner for the
benefit of the court and the jury.
The defense of insanity is usually a difficult one
to overcome. Unquestionably cases occur where
defendants are truly mentally sick and commit
crimes solely because of insanity. These people
are not responsible and belong in hospitals so
that they can be treated and society can be pro-
tected. However, there are many criminals who
hide behind this defense to escape just punishment
for their crimes. These defendants should be
vigorously prosecuted and convicted. I am con-
vinced that the average American jury composed
of intelligent people with common sense can
quickly see through a fraudulent defense. The
prosecutor, when faced with this defense, must
counter it in a vigorous but fair manner, ap-
pealing to the common sense and good judgment
of the jury, and by so doing, he will make certain
that justice is accomplished.
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